![]() ![]() Under the constraints of public reason, a liberal state must refrain from basing law solely on moral or religious doctrines but only such doctrines could furnish reason for restricting marriage to male-female couples or romantic love dyads. Political liberalism requires the disestablishment of monogamous amatonormative marriage. ![]() ![]() The central argument of Part Two, "Democratizing Marriage," is that liberal reasons for recognizing same-sex marriage also require recognition of groups, polyamorists, polygamists, friends, urban tribes, and adult care networks. The discussion raises issues of independent interest for the moral philosopher such as the possibilities and bounds of interpersonal moral obligations and the nature of commitment. Further, the special value accorded marriage sustains amatonormative discrimination - discrimination against non-amorous or non-exclusive caring relationships such as friendships, adult care networks, polyamorous groups, or urban tribes. The book contends with the most influential philosophical accounts of the moral value of marriage to argue that marriage has no inherent moral significance. In Part One, "De-Moralizing Marriage," essays on promise and commitment argue that we cannot promise to love and so wedding vows are (mostly) failed promises, and that marriage may be a poor commitment strategy. Yet what moral significance does it have? This book examines its morally salient features - promise, commitment, care, and contract - with surprising results. Even in secular and civil contexts, marriage retains sacramental connotations. ![]()
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